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Abstract	  	  Using	  a	  natural	  experiment	  designed	  by	   the	   Italian	  national	   test	  administrator	  (INVALSI)	   to	  monitor	  test	  procedures	  in	  Italian	  primary	  schools,	  this	  paper	  shows	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  external	  examiner	  who	  monitors	  test	  procedures	  has	  both	  a	  direct	  and	  an	   indirect	  effect	  on	  the	   measured	   performance	   of	   monitored	   classes	   and	   schools.	   The	   direct	   effect	   is	   the	  difference	   in	   the	   test	   performance	   between	   classes	   of	   the	   same	   school	   with	   and	   without	  external	  examiners.	  The	  indirect	  effect	  is	  instead	  the	  difference	  in	  performance	  between	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  in	  a	  school	  with	  an	  external	  examiner	  and	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  in	  schools	  without	  external	  monitoring.	  We	   find	   that	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	   in	   the	  class	  reduces	  the	  proportion	  of	  correct	  answers	  by	  5.5	  to	  8.6	  percent	  compared	  to	  classes	  in	  schools	  with	  no	  external	  monitor.	  Comparing	  results	  of	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  across	  schools	  with	  and	  without	  external	  examiners,	  we	  estimate	  indirect	  effects	  that	  range	  between	  1.2	  and	  1.9	  percent.	  The	  size	   of	   the	  overall	   effect	   of	   external	   supervision	   varies	   significantly	   across	   regions	   and	   it	   is	  higher	  in	  Southern	  Italy.	  	  	  	  Keywords:	  education,	  testing,	  monitoring,	  indirect	  treatment	  effects.	  JEL	  codes:	  C31,	  H52,	  I2.	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1.	  Introduction	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Test	  –	  based	  accountability	  systems	  in	  education	  are	  becoming	  widespread	  (see	  Figlio	  and	  Loeb,	  2011,	   for	   a	   review	  of	   the	   literature	  on	  accountability	   in	  education).	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  formal	   quantitative	   assessments	   of	   educational	   achievements	   are	   increasingly	   informing	  policy	  making.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   test-­‐based	  accountability	  systems	  generate	   incentives	   for	  teachers,	  students	  and	  school	  administrators	  to	  “game”	  the	  system	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  better	  scores.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  One	   way	   to	   address	   the	   threat	   of	   strategic	   manipulation	   is	   to	   have	   external	   examiners	  monitoring	  entirely	  or	   in	  part	   the	   test	  process.	  The	  purpose	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  evaluate	   the	  effects	  of	  external	  monitoring	  on	  test	  outcomes.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  we	  exploit	  an	  Italian	  natural	  experiment	  which	  assigned	  external	  examiners	   to	  randomly	  selected	  classes	  and	  schools,	   in	  charge	   of	   monitoring	   students	   taking	   the	   test	   and	   of	   reporting	   results	   to	   the	   central	   test	  administrator	   (INVALSI).	  We	  compare	   the	  results	  of	   the	   test	   in	   the	  classes	  with	  an	  external	  examiner	   with	   the	   results	   in	   other	   classes	   of	   the	   same	   school	   -­‐	   where	   the	   test	   was	  administered	  by	  a	  local	  teacher	  -­‐	  and	  in	  classes	  of	  other	  schools	  with	  no	  external	  examiner.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	   decompose	   the	   overall	   effect	   of	   external	   monitoring,	   which	   we	   measure	   as	   the	  difference	   in	   the	  average	  rate	  of	   correct	  answers	   in	  monitored	  classes	  and	   in	  classes	  of	  un-­‐monitored	  schools,	  into	  a	  direct	  and	  an	  indirect	  effect.	  The	  direct	  effect	  is	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  test	  performance	  between	  classes	  of	   the	   same	  school	  with	  and	  without	  external	   examiners.	  The	  indirect	  effect	  is	  instead	  the	  difference	  in	  performance	  between	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  in	  a	  school	   with	   an	   external	   examiner	   and	   un-­‐monitored	   classes	   in	   schools	   without	   external	  monitoring.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  spill-­‐over	  effects	  from	  monitored	  classes,	  the	  latter	  effect	  should	  be	  zero.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	   find	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   external	   examiners	   reduces	   the	   average	   rate	   of	   correct	  answers	   in	  monitored	  classes	  with	  respect	  both	  to	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  of	   the	  same	  school	  and	   to	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	   in	  schools	  with	  no	  external	  examiner.	  The	  effect	  of	  monitoring	  spills	  over	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  of	  schools	  with	  external	  examiners.	  We	  estimate	  that	  having	  an	   external	   examiner	   reduces	   the	   percentage	   of	   correct	   answers	   by	   3.6	   to	   5.4	   percentage	  points	  (equivalent	  to	  5.5	  to	  8.6	  percent	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  average	  score	  in	  classes	  belonging	  to	   schools	  with	  no	  external	   examiner),	   depending	  on	   the	  grade	  and	   the	   test.	  The	  estimated	  direct	   effect	   ranges	   from	  2.8	   to	  4.2	  percentage	  points	   (4.3	   to	  6.6	  percent),	   and	   the	   residual	  indirect	  effect	   from	  0.8	   to	  1.2	  percentage	  points	   (1.2	   to	  1.9	  percent).	  There	   is	  also	  evidence	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that	   the	  reduction	   in	  measured	  performance	   is	  significantly	  higher	   in	   the	  schools	   located	   in	  less	  developed	  Southern	  Italy	  than	  in	  Northern	  schools.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  argue	   that	   the	  negative	   effects	  of	   the	  presence	  of	   an	  external	   examiner	  on	  measured	  test	   scores	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   due	   to	   reduced	   cheating	   than	   to	   the	   negative	   effects	   of	  distraction	  from	  having	  a	  stranger	  in	  the	  class.	  Interestingly,	  the	  effects	  of	  monitoring	  spread	  from	   the	   monitored	   class	   to	   the	   other	   classes	   in	   the	   school.	   We	   propose	   two	   alternative	  reasons	  why	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  external	  examiner	  in	  the	  school	  acts	  as	  a	  disciplinary	  device	  also	  on	  students	  and	  teachers	   in	  other	  classes	  of	  the	  same	  school	  because	  of	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  examiner	  may	  roam	  about.	  The	  second	  is	  based	  on	  the	   idea	   that	   teachers	   in	   the	   same	  school	   share	  a	   concern	  both	   for	  average	  and	   for	   relative	  performance	  within	  the	  school.	  Both	  explanations	  predict	  that	  the	  indirect	  effect	  falls	  with	  the	  number	  of	  classes	  in	  the	  monitored	  school.	  Our	  evidence	  confirms	  this	  prediction.	  	  	  	  	  	  Our	   study	   contributes	   to	   the	   literature	   in	   several	   directions.	   First,	   we	   show	   that	   the	  introduction	   of	   external	   examiners	   has	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	   measured	   test	   scores	   in	   an	  environment	  where	  there	  are	  incentives	  to	  manipulate	  results.	  Second,	  we	  document	  that	  the	  monitoring	  effects	  of	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	  spills	  over	  to	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  of	  the	  same	   school.	   This	   is	   important	  when	   considering	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   having	   external	  examiners.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   paper	   is	   organized	   as	   follows:	   Section	   2	   reviews	   the	   relevant	   literature;	   Section	   3	  describes	  the	  design	  of	  the	  INVALSI	  test	  and	  the	  dataset.	  The	  empirical	  strategy	  is	  presented	  in	  Section	  4.	  The	  main	  empirical	  results	  and	  a	  few	  robustness	  checks	  are	  reported	  in	  Section	  5	  and	   6,	   respectively.	   We	   discuss	   alternative	   interpretations	   of	   our	   results	   in	   Section	   7.	  Conclusions	  follow.	  	  
2.	  Review	  of	  the	  literature	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   their	   seminal	  work,	   Jacob	   and	   Levitt	   (2003)	   show	   that	   a	   fraction	   of	   Chicago	   teachers	  reacted	   to	   accountability	   pressures	   by	   fraudulently	   completing	   student	   tests	   in	   order	   to	  improve	  outcomes.	  They	  develop	  algorithms	   to	  detect	   cheating	   that	   rely	  on	   the	  presence	  of	  unusual	   response	   patterns	   within	   the	   answers	   given	   by	   students	   and	   by	   looking	   at	   the	  performance	   of	   the	   same	   class	   over	   different	   years.	   Aside	   from	   outright	   cheating,	   the	  literature	  has	  identified	  several	  indirect	  ways	  that	  teachers	  and	  school	  administrators	  can	  use	  to	  manipulate	  student	  results.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Jacob	  (2005),	  Figlio	  (2006),	  Figlio	  and	  Getzler	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(2006),	  Cullen	  and	  Reback	  (2006)	  and	  Hussain	  (2012)	  investigate	  whether	  schools	  engage	  in	  strategic	   manipulation	   of	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   pool	   of	   tested	   students	   by	   excluding	   low	  ability	   students,	   either	   by	   reclassifying	   them	   as	   disabled	   or	   by	   strategically	   using	   grade	  retention	   and	  disciplinary	   suspensions.	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Figlio	   and	  Winicki	   (2005)	   show	  that	   during	   testing	   periods	   some	   schools	   increase	   the	   caloric	   intake	   provided	   by	   school	  cafeterias	   so	   as	   to	   boost	   student	   performance.	   Attempts	   to	   increase	   test	   scores	   by	   taking	  psycho-­‐stimulant	   drugs	   are	   documented	   for	   the	  US	   by	   Bokhari	   and	   Schneider	   (2011),	  who	  show	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  diagnosis	  of	   “attention	  deficit/hyperactivity	  disorder”	   in	  states	  where	  there	  are	  stronger	  accountability	  laws.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  little	  has	  been	  done	  in	  this	  literature	  to	  investigate	  the	  indirect	  effects	  of	  monitoring	  teachers	  and	  students.	  These	  effects	  are	  discussed	  instead	  in	  the	  broad	  literature	  on	   labour	   market	   policy	   evaluation.	   Heckman,	   Lalonde	   and	   Smith	   (1999)	   review	   this	  literature	  and	  discuss	  how	  policy	  effects	  may	  spread	  to	  those	  not	  directly	  participating	  in	  the	  programme	  mainly	   because	  of	   general	   equilibrium	  or	   spill-­‐over	   effects.	  Miguel	   and	  Kremer	  (2004)	   evaluate	   both	   direct	   and	   external	   effects	   of	   a	  Kenyan	   programme	   aimed	   at	   treating	  intestinal	  worms	  infection	  among	  primary	  school	  kids.	  In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  Angelucci	  and	  De	  Giorgi	   (2009)	   evaluate	   the	   effects	   of	   Progresa,	   a	   Mexican	   aid	   programme	   based	   on	   cash	  transfers	  and	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  estimating	  indirect	  treatment	  effects	  on	  the	  ineligibles	  when	  there	  are	  social	  interactions	  between	  	  eligible	  and	  ineligible	  individuals.	  	  
	  
3.	  The	  Design	  of	  INVALSI	  Servizio	  Nazionale	  di	  Valutazione	  (SNV)	  Tests	  and	  the	  Data	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  INVALSI1	   tests	  were	   introduced	   in	   Italian	  primary	   schools	   in	   20082,	  with	   the	   purpose	   of	  evaluating	  school	  productivity	  (in	  terms	  of	  value	  added)	  by	  using	  standardized	  tests	  in	  Italian	  and	  maths.	   These	   tests	   are	   not	   formally	   high-­‐stakes,	   because	   the	   allocation	   of	   resources	   to	  schools,	   the	   salary	  of	   teachers	   and	   the	   school	   career	  of	   students	  do	  not	  depend	  on	   the	   test	  outcomes.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   government	   in	   charge	   when	   they	   were	   introduced	   explicitly	  supported	   the	   view	   that	   the	   tests	   should	   matter	   in	   the	   evaluation	   of	   the	   performance	   of	  teachers.	   Even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   explicit	   high	   stakes,	   pressure	   to	   perform	   well	   was	   high	  because	  the	  school	  reputation	  was	  also	  at	  stake.	  While	  results	  of	  the	  tests	  were	  not	  publicly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  INVALSI	  is	  the	  National	  Institute	  for	  the	  Evaluation	  of	  the	  Educational	  System,	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  design	  and	  administration	  of	  standardized	  educational	  tests	  in	  Italy.	  2	  See	  Law	  Decree	  n.147	  –	  2007,	  and	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  and	  Research	  Decree	  n.74	  and	  76	  –	  2009.	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available,	  schools	  and	  their	  principals	  could	  access	  the	  results	  of	  their	  students	  and	  decide	  to	  make	  them	  public,	  which	  created	  another	  incentive	  to	  perform	  well.	  Since	  2008	  the	  tests	  have	  been	  administered	  every	  year.	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  2009/2010	  wave	  because	  of	  its	  peculiar	  design	   features.	  First,	   the	  wave	  was	  the	   first	   to	   test	   the	  entire	  population	  of	   Italian	  primary	   school	   students	   in	   their	   second	   and	   fifth	   grade.	   Second,	   in	   order	   to	   monitor	   the	  correct	   implementation	   of	   the	   mandated	   testing	   procedures,	   INVALSI	   selected	   ex-­‐ante	   a	  random	   sample	   of	   classes	  where	   the	   test	  was	   administered	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   external	  observer	  (see	  INVALSI,	  2010a).	  This	  observer	  had	  two	  main	  tasks:	  to	  be	  present	  in	  the	  class	  during	  the	  test	  administration	  and	  to	  report	  student	  answers	  on	  the	  dedicated	  answer	  sheets	  and	   transmit	   them	   to	   INVALSI	   for	   correction.	   In	   the	   other	   classes,	   instead,	   the	   test	   was	  administered	  by	  teachers	  of	  the	  school	  (but	  not	  of	  the	  class	  and	  not	  in	  the	  subject	  tested),	  and	  reporting	  was	  done	  jointly	  with	  the	  teacher	  of	  the	  class.	  	  	  	  	  	  Classes	  were	  selected	  using	  a	  two-­‐stages	  sampling	  scheme,	  stratified	  by	  region3.	  In	  the	  first	  stage,	   a	   given	   number	   of	   schools	   in	   each	   region	   were	   randomly	   selected	   by	   probabilistic	  sampling,	  with	  the	  probability	  of	  inclusion	  proportional	  to	  school	  size,	  measured	  by	  the	  total	  number	   of	   students	   enrolled	   in	   the	   tested	   grades.	   In	   the	   second	   stage,	   one	   or	   two	   classes	  within	  each	   treated	  school	  were	  selected	  by	  simple	  random	  sampling.	  Figure	  1	  summarizes	  the	   sampling	   scheme	  and	  Table	  1	   shows	   the	  characteristics	  of	   the	  national	   sample	   for	  each	  grade4.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  have	  access	  to	  micro	  data	  for	  the	  entire	  population	  of	  second	  and	  fifth	  grade	  primary	  school	  students	  who	  took	  the	  INVALSI	  tests	  in	  2009/2010.	  The	  data	  includes	  information	  on	  the	  answers	  given	  by	  each	  student	   to	  each	  question	   in	   the	   test,	  on	  past	   individual	  marks	   in	  Italian	  and	  maths	  and	  on	  parental	  background.	  The	  latter	  information	  was	  filled	  in	  by	  school	  offices.	   Exclusively	   for	   fifth	   graders,	   INVALSI	   used	   a	   student	   questionnaire	   asking	   further	  information	  on	  their	  family	  background	  and	  on	  feelings	  and	  motivation	  during	  the	  tests.	  We	  also	   obtained	   from	   INVALSI	   additional	   information	   on	   school	   and	   class	   characteristics,	  including	   the	   number	   of	   students	   enrolled	   in	   each	   class	   and	   in	   each	   school	   for	   each	   tested	  grade	  and	  whether	  the	  school	  is	  public	  or	  private5.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   Valle	   d’Aosta	   and	   the	   Province	   of	   Bolzano	   autonomously	   decided	   to	   have	   all	   classes	   assigned	   to	   external	  monitoring.	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  exclude	  them	  from	  the	  following	  analysis.	  
4 INVALSI	  (2010a)	  has	  developed	  its	  own	  procedure	  to	  detect	  cheating	  among	  monitored	  classes	  and	  concluded	  that	  there	  is	  no	  cheating	  problem	  within	  this	  group	  of	  classes.	  The	  cheating	  detection	  algorithm	  is	  described	  in	  INVALSI	  (2010b).	  5	  Summing	  up,	  the	  following	  variables	  are	  available:	  1)	  at	  the	  school	  level:	  private	  or	  public	  school,	  whether	  the	  school	  offers	  full	  time	  schedule;	  2)	  at	  the	  class	  level:	  class	  size,	  full-­‐	  or	  part-­‐	  time	  schedule	  (measured	  in	  term	  of	  the	   schedule	  of	   the	  median	   student	   in	   the	   class,	   to	   avoid	  measurement	   errors);	   3)	   at	   individual	   level:	   gender,	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  4.	  Identification	  and	  Estimation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	   define	   the	   following	   three	   potential	   outcomes	   at	   the	   class	   level:	   Y00	   is	   the	   potential	  outcome	   if	   the	   class	  was	   assigned	   to	   a	   school	  with	   no	   external	   observer	   (i.e.,	   an	   untreated	  class	   in	  an	  untreated	  school),	  Y11	   is	   the	  potential	  class	  outcome	   in	  case	  of	  direct	  monitoring	  (i.e.,	  a	  treated	  class	  in	  a	  treated	  school)	  and	  Y01	  is	  the	  potential	  class	  outcome	  if	  the	  class	  was	  not	  monitored	  by	  an	  external	  examiner	  but	  belonged	  to	  a	  school	  where	  at	  least	  one	  other	  class	  was	  monitored	  (i.e.,	  an	  untreated	  class	  in	  a	  treated	  school).	  By	  design,	  all	  classes	  of	  untreated	  schools	  are	  un-­‐monitored,	  i.e.,	  no	  monitored	  class	  is	  present	  in	  an	  untreated	  school.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Let	   the	   dummy	   variable	   Sj	   take	   value	   1	   if	   school	   j	   has	   been	   assigned	   to	   school-­‐level	  treatment	  (and	  zero	  otherwise)	  and	  the	  dummy	  Ci	  take	  value	  1	  if	  class	  i	  has	  been	  assigned	  to	  class-­‐level	   treatment.	  The	  observed	  outcome	  Yij	   of	   class	   i	   in	   school	   j	  may	  be	   represented	   in	  terms	  of	  potential	  outcomes	  as	  follows:	  	  
€ 
Yij = (1− S j )Y00 + S jCiY11 + S j (1−Ci)Y01	   	   	   	   	   	  (1)	  	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  identification	  and	  estimation	  of	  the	  following	  quantities:	  
• The	  average	  direct	  effect	  of	  monitoring:	  E[Y11-­‐Y01],	  
• The	  average	  indirect	  effect	  of	  monitoring:	  E[Y01-­‐Y00],	  
• The	  average	  total	  effect	  of	  monitoring:	  E[Y11-­‐Y00].	  where	  E	  is	  the	  mean	  operator.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	   sampling	   procedure	   –	   described	   in	   INVALSI	   (2010a)	   –	   has	   the	   following	   features:	   a)	  within	  a	  region,	   two	  schools	  of	   the	  same	  size	   (i.e.,	   same	  number	  of	   students	  enrolled	   in	   the	  second	  and	  fifth	  grade)	  have	  the	  same	  probability	  of	  being	  assigned	  to	  school-­‐level	  treatment;	  b)	   two	   treated	   schools	   of	   same	   size	   have	   the	   same	   probability	   of	   being	   assigned	   to	   the	  selection	  of	  one	  or	   two	   classes	  per	   grade	   for	   external	  monitoring;	   c)	   two	   classes	  of	   a	   given	  grade	  belonging	  to	  two	  different	  treated	  schools	  with	  the	  same	  size	  have	  the	  same	  probability	  of	  being	  monitored	  if	   the	  number	  of	  classes	   in	  the	  grade	  is	  the	  same	  in	  the	  two	  schools.	  We	  thus	  have	  conditional	  randomization,	  implying	  that:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  place	  of	  birth,	  citizenship,	  attendance	  of	  pre-­‐primary	  school,	  age,	  maths	  and	  Italian	  grade	  in	  previous	  semester,	  employment,	  education	  and	  nationality	  of	  parents.	  Moreover,	  for	  fifth	  grade	  students	  we	  also	  have	  information	  on	   the	   following	  variables:	  motivation	   and	   feelings	  during	   the	   test,	  whether	   at	   home	   the	   student	  has	  his	   own	  bedroom,	   internet	  access,	  an	  encyclopedia,	  his	  own	  desk,	  a	  computer	  and	  a	  place	   for	  doing	  his	  homework,	   the	  number	  of	  books	  that	  are	  present	  at	  home,	  the	  number	  of	  siblings,	  whether	  he	  lives	  with	  both	  parents	  or	  not,	  the	  language	  spoken	  at	  home,	  whether	  he	  gets	  help	  with	  his	  homework	  or	  not.	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• in	  each	  region,	  the	  assignment	  to	  school	  -­‐	  level	  treatment	  is	  random,	  conditional	  on	  the	  size	  of	  the	  school,	  measured	  by	  the	  number	  of	  students	  enrolled	  in	  the	  second	  and	  fifth	  grade;	  	  
• assignment	  to	  class	  -­‐	  level	  treatment	  for	  a	  class	  of	  a	  given	  grade	  in	  a	  treated	  school	  is	  random	   conditional	   on	   the	   size	   of	   the	   school,	   measured	   by	   the	   number	   of	   students	  enrolled	   in	   the	   second	   and	   fifth	   grade	   and	   by	   the	   number	   of	   classes	   in	   the	   selected	  grade.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Let	  RD	  be	   the	  vector	  of	   regional	  dummies,	  RSj	   the	  vector	  of	   regional	  dummies	   interacted	  with	  the	  size	  of	  school	  j	  and	  RCj	  the	  vector	  of	  regional	  dummies	  interacted	  with	  the	  number	  of	  classes	  in	  a	  given	  grade	  in	  school	  j.	  Letting	  R	  =	  [RD,	  RS,	  RC],	  conditional	  independence	  in	  each	  considered	  grade	  requires	  that	  	  	  
€ 
Y00,  Y01,  Y11 ⊥ S j ,  Ci |R 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (2)	  	  	  Under	  this	  assumption,	  the	  effects	  of	  monitoring	  are	  given	  by	  	  	  
€ 
E[Yij |Ci =1,S j =1,R] − E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j =1,R] = E[Y11 −Y01 |R] 	   	   (3)	  	  
€ 
E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j =1,R] − E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j = 0,R] = E[Y01 −Y00 |R]	   	   (4)	  	  and	  	  
€ 
E[Yij |Ci =1,S j =1,R] − E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j = 0,R] = E[Y11 −Y00 |R]	   	   (5)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  test	  for	  successful	  randomization	  by	  checking	  whether	  the	  vector	  X	  of	  pre-­‐determined	  covariates	  at	  the	  school,	  class	  and	  individual	  level	  are	  balanced	  in	  the	  treatment	  and	  control	  sub-­‐samples6.	  While	  we	  have	  data	  on	   second	  and	   fifth	  graders,	  we	   focus	  hereinafter	  on	   the	  latter	  to	  save	  space.	  Some	  results	  for	  second	  graders	  are	  presented	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  Table	  2	  shows	  the	  means	  and	  standard	  deviations	  of	  the	  variables	  in	  the	  vector	  X	  for	  the	  full	  sample.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  covariates	  considered	  are	  those	  listed	  in	  footnote	  5.	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To	  test	  for	  balancing	  we	  first	  focus	  on	  differences	  between	  treated	  and	  untreated	  schools,	  and	  then	  consider	  differences	  between	  treated	  and	  untreated	  classes	  within	  treated	  schools.	  The	  tests	  are	  based	  on	  the	  following	  regression	  models:	  	  
€ 
X j = α + βt j + ρRD+σRS j +ε j 	   	   	   	   	   	   (6)	  	  and	  	  
€ 
Xij = α + βtij + ρR +ε ij 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (7)	  	  for	   the	   first	  and	  the	  second	  stage	  randomization	  respectively,	  where	  t	  are	  dummy	  variables	  for	   treatment	   at	   the	   school	   and	   class	   level.	   Table	   3	   reports	   the	   point	   estimates	   of	   the	   β	  coefficients	  and	  the	  p-­‐values	  of	  the	  test	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  H0:	  β=0	  for	  each	  covariate.7	  Results	  do	   not	   suggest	   that	   unbalancing	   is	   a	   problem	   for	   school	   and	   class-­‐level	   variables.	   Since	  balancing	   is	   not	   attained	   for	   the	   number	   of	   students	   enrolled	   in	   a	   class,	   which	   is	   greater	  among	  treated	  classes,	  we	  include	  this	  variable	  as	  a	  covariate	  in	  all	  the	  following	  regressions.	  Turning	   to	   individual	   variables,	   although	   in	   some	   cases	   we	   detect	   statistically	   significant	  differences	   across	   the	   various	   groups,	   the	   point	   estimates	   show	   that	   these	   differences	   are	  virtually	   zero	   in	   almost	   all	   cases.	   Prudentially,	  we	   introduce	   the	   variables	  with	   statistically	  significant	   differences	   as	   covariates	   in	   our	   regressions	   to	   eliminate	   the	   risk	   of	   unbalancing	  and	  increase	  precision.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  monitoring	  using	  the	  following	  regression	  	  
€ 
Yij = α + βCijS j + γS j +δR j +θXij +ε ij 	   	   	   	   	   (8)	  	  Standard	  errors	  are	  robust	  and	  weighted	  by	  class	  size	  whenever	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  average	  test	  performance	  in	  the	  class.	  From	  this	  regression	  we	  obtain	  the	  direct,	  indirect	  and	  total	  effects	  of	  external	  monitoring	  as	  follows	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	   Results	   are	   shown	   for	   the	   fifth	   grade	  maths	   test	   only,	   but	   are	   very	   similar	   for	   grade	   II	   (available	   from	   the	  authors	  upon	  requests).	   In	   these	  and	  the	  other	  estimates	  of	   this	  paper	  we	  drop	  from	  the	  sample	  hereafter	   the	  schools	  where	  there	  is	  a	  different	  number	  of	  second	  and	  fifth	  grade	  classes	  assigned	  to	  monitoring,	  because	  this	  outcome	   is	   not	   in	   line	  with	   the	   sampling	   scheme	   and	  may	   be	   a	   symptom	   of	  manipulation	   in	   the	   selection	   of	  treated	  classes.	  We	  also	  drop	  the	  classes	  with	  less	  than	  five	  students	  and	  the	  schools	  with	  a	  single	  class	  per	  grade	  or	  with	  two	  classes	  if	  both	  were	  assigned	  to	  monitoring.	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€ 
β = E[Yij |Ci =1,S j =1,R,X] − E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j =1,R,X]	   	   	   (9)	  	  
€ 
γ = E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j =1,R,X] − E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j = 0,R,X] 	   	   	   (10)	  	  and	   	  	  
€ 
γ + β = E[Yij |Ci =1,S j =1,R,X] − E[Yij |Ci = 0,S j = 0,R,X]	   	   (11)	  	  
4.	  Results	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	  4	  presents	  our	  estimates	  for	  fifth	  graders	  and	  the	  maths	  test.	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  mean	  percentage	  of	  correct	  answers	  given	  by	  each	  student	  in	  the	  class8.	  While	  the	  first	  column	   in	   the	   table	   considers	   all	   Italian	   regions,	   the	   remaining	   columns	   present	   separate	  estimates	  by	  macro	  area	  (North,	  Centre	  and	  South).	  We	  find	  that	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	  in	   the	   class	   reduces	   the	   percentage	   of	   correct	   answers	   by	   3.59	   percentage	   points,	   which	  corresponds	   to	   a	   5.5	   percent	   decline	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  mean	   score	   in	   untreated	   schools.	  Close	   to	   80	   percent	   (2.79/3.59)	   of	   this	   total	   effect	   is	   direct,	   and	   the	   remaining	   20	   percent	  (0.81/3.59)	   is	   indirect.	  As	   shown	   in	  Table	  A.2	   in	   the	  Appendix,	   the	   total	  effect	   is	   somewhat	  larger	   for	  second	  graders	   (5.4	  percentage	  points,	  or	  8.6%	  of	   the	  average	  score	   in	  untreated	  schools).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  size	  of	  the	  total,	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effects	  varies	  with	  the	  macro	  area	  and	  is	  highest	  in	  Southern	   regions	   (-­‐8.9%)	   and	   lowest	   in	   Northern	   Italy	   (-­‐2.6%).	   How	   do	   we	   explain	   these	  negative	   effects?	  One	   possibility	   is	   that	   young	   students	   are	   distracted	   by	   the	   presence	   of	   a	  stranger	  in	  the	  class	  and	  under-­‐perform	  as	  a	  consequence.	  The	  other	  possibility	  is	  that	  either	  students	  or	  teachers	  in	  classes	  without	  the	  external	  examiner	  engage	  in	  outright	  cheating.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	   believe	   that	   the	   second	   explanation	   is	  more	   likely	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   there	   is	   no	  evidence	  that	  students	   in	  classes	  with	  the	  external	  examiner	  are	  negatively	  affected	   in	  their	  feelings	   and	  motivation	   to	   complete	   the	   test	   properly.	   In	   a	   questionnaire	   filled	   up	   by	   fifth	  graders	  participating	  to	  the	  test	   in	  classes	  with	  and	  without	  the	  external	  examiner,	   INVALSI	  asked	   a	   set	   of	   motivational	   questions	   aimed	   at	   capturing	   the	   psychological	   status	   of	   the	  student	  during	  the	  test,	  which	  included	  agreeing	  or	  not	  with	  the	  following	  sentences:	  a)	  I	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Results	  for	  Italian	  and	  second	  graders	  are	  qualitatively	  similar	  and	  are	  shown	  in	  Appendix	  1.	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already	  anxious	  before	  starting	   the	   test;	  b)	   I	  was	  so	  nervous	   I	   couldn’t	   find	   the	  answers;	   c)	  while	  answering	  I	  felt	  like	  I	  was	  doing	  badly;	  d)	  while	  answering,	  I	  was	  calm.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	   5	   presents	   the	   results	   of	   estimating	   equation	   (8)	   on	   the	   full	   sample	   when	   the	  dependent	  variable	   is	   the	  percentage	  of	  students	   in	   the	  class	  agreeing	  with	  each	  of	   the	   four	  statements	   above.	   We	   find	   no	   evidence	   that	   being	   in	   a	   class	   with	   an	   external	   examiner	  increased	  anxiety	  or	  nervousness.	  Quite	  the	  opposite,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  students	  in	  these	  classes	  were	  less	  nervous	  and	  calmer.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Second,	   we	   examine	   the	   distribution	   of	   results	   within	   classes.	   If	   outright	   cheating	   by	  students	  and/or	   teachers	  was	  taking	  place	   in	   the	  classes	  without	   the	  external	  examiner,	  we	  should	  find	  that	  –	  ceteris	  paribus	  -­‐	  the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  and	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  results	   are	   lower	   than	   in	   classes	   with	   the	   examiner,	   where	   cheating	   is	   precluded	   by	  definition9.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   external	   controls,	   the	   teacher	   can	   communicate	   the	   correct	  answers	  to	  students	  or	  change	  their	  answers	  in	  the	  answer	  sheet,	  or	  students	  can	  simply	  copy	  from	   each	   other.	   In	   either	   case,	   the	  within	   –	   class	   coefficient	   of	   variation	   and	   the	   standard	  deviation	   of	   the	   percentage	   of	   correct	   answers	   are	   bound	   to	   decline.	  While	   distraction	   can	  reduce	  average	  performance,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  is	  should	  reduce	  also	  its	  variability.	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	   6	   shows	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   external	   examiner	   on	   the	  within	   –	   class	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  percentage	  of	  correct	  answers,	  as	  well	  as	  on	   the	  bottom	  quartile,	  median	  and	   top	  quartile	  of	   the	  distribution	  of	   test	  scores.	  The	   table	  only	   considers	   Southern	   Italy	   and	   the	  maths	   scores	   of	   fifth	   graders.	  We	   find	   that	   both	   the	  coefficient	  of	  variation	  and	  the	  standard	  deviation	  are	  significantly	  higher	  in	  classes	  with	  an	  external	  examiner.	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  external	  examiner	  affects	  to	  a	   higher	   extent	   the	   performance	   of	   students	   in	   the	   lower	   quartile	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	  outcomes,	   in	   line	  with	   the	   expectation	   that	   cheating	   typically	   helps	   low	   performers.	  When	  compared	  with	  students	  in	  untreated	  schools,	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	  reduces	  the	  score	  of	   these	   students	   by	   a	   13.7	   percent	   (-­‐7.62/55.6).	   This	   effect	   is	   stronger	   for	   second	   grade	  students,	  where	  it	  reaches	  a	  striking	  20.7	  percent.	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  further	  document	  that	  our	  results	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  cheating	  by	  computing	  an	  index	  of	  heterogeneity	   in	   the	  pattern	  of	  answers	  given	   in	  each	  class.	  For	  each	  class	  and	  question	  we	  compute	  a	  modified	  version	  of	  the	  Herfindahl	  Index10	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  We	  are	  assuming	  that	  the	  external	  examiner	  does	  not	  collude	  with	  school	  teachers	  and	  principals	  to	  boost	  school	  results.	  10	  See	  INVALSI	  (2010b)	  








.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (12)	  
	  where	  sa	  is	  the	  within-­‐class	  share	  of	  students	  who	  chose	  “a”	  in	  the	  set	  A	  of	  possible	  choices11.	  This	   indicator	   varies	  between	  0	   and	  1,	  with	  higher	   values	   signalling	   a	  more	  heterogeneous	  pattern	   of	   answers	   to	   a	   given	   question.	  We	   obtain	   an	   overall	  measure	   of	   heterogeneity	   by	  averaging	  H	  across	  all	  questions	  in	  the	  test.	  The	  lower	  this	  measure	  the	  higher	  the	  likelihood	  that	   systematic	   cheating	   has	   occurred	   in	   the	   class.	   Table	   (7)	   reports	   the	   results	   for	   fifth	  graders	   engaged	   in	   the	  maths	   test.	   The	   estimates	   in	   column	   (1),	   which	   refer	   to	   the	   entire	  country,	  show	  that	  monitored	  classes	  have	  a	  more	  heterogeneous	  pattern	  of	  answers	  than	  un-­‐monitored	  classes.	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  of	  a	  statistically	  significant	  indirect	  effect.	  Again,	  the	  effects	   of	   external	  monitoring	   on	   the	   heterogeneity	   of	   answers	   increase	   significantly	   as	  we	  move	  from	  Northern	  to	  Southern	  Italy	  (columns	  (2)	  to	  (4)).	  	  
5.	  Robustness	  checks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   this	   section	  we	   investigate	  whether	   our	  main	   results	   are	   robust	   to	   several	   sensitivity	  checks.	   First,	   since	   the	  dependent	   variable	   of	   our	  main	   estimates	   is	   a	   fraction	   (the	   average	  percentage	   of	   correct	   answers	   in	   the	   class)	  we	   implement	   the	   GLM	   estimator	   proposed	   by	  Papke	  and	  Wooldridge	  (1996)	  to	  deal	  with	  fractional	  dependent	  variables.	  Results,	  shown	  in	  Table	  A.4	  in	  Appendix	  1,	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  baselines	  estimates	  in	  Table	  4.	  Second,	  we	  exploit	  the	   census	  nature	  of	   our	  data	   and	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  observe	   almost	   the	   entire	  population	  of	  students	  in	  each	  grade	  to	  apply	  a	  finite	  population	  correction	  to	  statistical	  inference.	  Results	  (see	  Table	  A.5	  in	  the	  Appendix)	  are	  qualitatively	  unchanged	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  baseline,	  but	  precision	  increases	  significantly.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Third,	  we	  drop	   all	   observable	   covariates	  not	   required	   for	   balancing.	   Since	   assignment	   to	  treatment	   does	   not	   depend	   on	   observables,	   finding	   differences	   between	   the	   estimates	   that	  include	  and	  exclude	  covariates	  is	  a	  symptom	  of	  strategic	  manipulation	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  the	   pool	   of	   tested	   students.	   Results	   in	   Table	   A.6	   in	   Appendix	   1	   do	   not	   provide	   any	   strong	  evidence	   in	   this	   direction.	   Finally,	   we	   test	   directly	   for	   differences	   in	   absenteeism	   across	  treatment	  statuses,	  using	  as	  dependent	  variable	   the	  percentage	  of	  students	  absent	   from	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  We	  treat	  missing	  values	  as	  a	  separate	  category.	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test	   in	   each	   class.	  Again,	  differences	   in	  behaviour	  across	   the	   three	  groups	  are	  minimal	   (see	  Table	  A.7	  in	  the	  Appendix).	  	  	  
6.	  Discussion	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  paper	  has	  three	  empirical	  findings:	  1)	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	  reduces	  the	  average	  test	  score	  in	  the	  class	  with	  respect	  to	  classes	  where	  the	  test	  is	  administered	  by	  local	  teachers;	  2)	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  external	  examiner	  spills	  over	  to	  other	  classes	  in	  the	  same	  school;	  3)	  the	  size	  of	  the	  external	  monitoring	  effects	  is	  larger	  in	  Southern	  Italy	  than	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  We	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  first	  result	   is	  consistent	  with	  teachers	  and	  students	  manipulating	  test	  results	  in	  the	  classes	  without	  external	  examiners.	  We	  have	  also	  ruled	  out	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  based	  on	  student	  distraction	  in	  treated	  classes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  indirect	  effect	  of	  monitoring	  in	  school	  tests	  has	  not	  been	  detected	  before	  and	  deserves	  some	   explanation.	   One	   interpretation	   is	   that	   teachers	   administering	   the	   test	   in	   the	   same	  school	  where	  the	  external	  examiner	  is	  present	  are	  afraid	  to	  be	  monitored	  by	  this	  supervisor	  and	   therefore	  restrain	   their	  cheating	  activities.	  This	   fear	   is	   rather	   irrational,	  as	   the	  external	  examiner’s	  mandate	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  randomly	  selected	  class.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  An	   alternative	   explanation	   is	   that	   teachers	   dislike	   excessive	   dispersion	   in	   average	   test	  scores	  within	  the	  same	  school,	  because	  such	  dispersion	  could	  generate	  conflicts.	  To	  illustrate,	  consider	   a	   school	   where	   a	   single	   class	   is	   supervised	   by	   an	   external	   examiner.	   If	   teachers	  administering	   the	   test	   in	  other	  classes	  cheat	   freely,	   their	  classes	  will	   look	  much	  better	   than	  the	   supervised	   class,	   where	   cheating	   is	   not	   possible.	   This	   may	   generate	   conflicts	   with	   the	  teacher	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  supervised	  class.	  To	  reduce	  these	  conflicts,	  teachers	  in	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  reduce	  their	  cheating.	  	  	  
Conclusions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Test-­‐based	   accountability	   systems	   in	   education	   may	   be	   gamed	   by	   teachers	   and	   school	  administrators	   in	  order	  to	  obtain	  higher	  measured	   levels	  of	  performance.	  This	  paper	  shows	  that	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	  who	  monitors	  test	  procedures	  has	  both	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effects	  on	  the	  measured	  performance	  of	  tested	  classes	  and	  schools.	  The	  direct	  effect	  is	  on	  the	  monitored	  class,	  the	  indirect	  effect	  is	  on	  the	  un-­‐monitored	  classes	  of	  the	  same	  school.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	   have	   used	   a	   natural	   experiment	   designed	   by	   the	   Italian	   national	   test	   administrator	  (INVALSI)	  to	  monitor	  test	  procedures	  in	  Italian	  primary	  schools.	  The	  design	  of	  the	  experiment	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is	  such	  that	  we	  observe	  test	  results	  in	  the	  universe	  of	  Italian	  primary	  schools.	  However,	  only	  some	   randomly	   selected	   classes	   of	   randomly	   selected	   schools	   were	   assigned	   to	   external	  monitoring.	  We	  have	  used	  random	  assignment	   to	   treatment	   to	  estimate	  both	   the	  direct	  and	  indirect	  effects	  of	  monitoring,	  by	  comparing	  monitored	  and	  unmonitored	  classes	  within	   the	  same	  schools	  in	  the	  former	  case	  and	  unmonitored	  classes	  in	  school	  where	  there	  is	  an	  external	  examiner	  and	  unmonitored	  classes	  in	  schools	  without	  the	  external	  examiner.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  have	  found	  that	  the	  overall	  effects	  (direct	  plus	  indirect)	  of	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	  are	  statistically	  significant	  and	  sizeable:	  depending	  on	  the	  grade,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  examiner	  reduces	  the	  average	  percent	  of	  correct	  answers	  in	  the	  class	  by	  5.5	  to	  8.5	  percent	  with	  respect	  to	  classes	  in	  schools	  with	  no	  external	  monitor.	  There	  is	  also	  evidence	  that	  indirect	  effects	  are	  present,	   although	   their	   size	   is	   rather	   small	   (about	   20	   percent	   of	   the	   total	   effect).	   Using	  supporting	  evidence	  on	  the	  motivation	  of	  students	  and	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  external	  monitoring	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  results	  within	  classes,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  these	  effects	  are	  consistent	  with	  teachers	  and/or	  students	  manipulating	  results	  in	  the	  classes	  without	  the	  external	  examiner.	  	  	  	  	  	  Perhaps	  unsurprisingly,	   the	   size	  of	   the	  overall	   effect	  of	   external	   supervision	   is	  highest	   in	  Southern	   Italy,	  where	   one	  may	   suspect	   that	   poor	   social	   capital	   leads	   to	   extensive	   cheating.	  Finally,	  we	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  indirect	  effect,	  albeit	  small,	  can	  be	  explained	  either	  with	  fear	  of	  supervision	  or	  with	  a	  behavioural	  model	  where	  teachers	  administering	  the	  tests	  dislike	  excessive	  dispersion	  of	  test	  results	  within	  the	  school.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Our	   results	   speak	   clearly	   against	   using	   raw	   average	   test	   results	   to	   rank	   schools.	   Such	  ranking	  would	  be	  grossly	  misleading,	  especially	  in	  Southern	  Italy,	  where	  the	  overall	  effect	  of	  monitoring	  is	  close	  to	  10	  percent.	  Given	  the	  unfeasibility	  of	  having	  an	  external	  examiner	  in	  all	  the	   classes	   of	   the	   universe	   of	   Italian	   primary	   schools,	   a	  more	   feasible	   alternative	   is	   to	   use	  estimates	  such	  as	  ours	  to	  properly	  correct	  the	  average	  scores	  of	  un-­‐monitored	  schools12.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  INVALSI	  (2010b)	  proposes	  an	  alternative	  methodology	  to	  detect	  and	  correct	  for	  cheating	  that	  is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  comparison	  between	  monitored	  an	  un-­‐monitored	  classes.	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FIGURES	  AND	  TABLES	  	  	  Figure	  1.	  Sampling	  Scheme	  –	  INVALSI	  SNV	  Test	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  Table	  1.	  National	  Samples	  –	  INVALSI	  SNV	  Test	  
	   Total	  schools	   Total	  classes	   Total	  students	   Sampled	  schools	   Sampled	  classes	   Sampled	  students	  Second	  Grade	   7,700	   30,175	   555,347	   1,385	   2,000	   39,299	  Fifth	  Grade	   7,700	   30,476	   565,064	   1,385	   2,000	   39,643	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Table	  2.	  Covariates	  -­‐	  Maths	  -­‐	  V	  grade	  	  Panel	  a.	  	   Mean	   St	  Dev	   	   	   Mean	   St	  Dev	  Gender	     	   Mother	  occupation	     Missing	  (%)	   0.01 0.10 	   Missing	  (%)	   0.20 0.40 Male	  (%)	   0.50 0.50 	   Unemployed	  or	  retired	  (%)	   0.35 0.48 Place	  of	  birth	     	   Employee	  (%)	   0.31 0.46 Missing	  (%)	   0.04 0.20 	   Entrepreneur	  (%)	   0.08 0.28 Italy	  (%)	   0.89 0.31 	   Middle	  manager	  (%)	   0.06 0.23 Citizenship	     	   Father	  occupation	     Missing	  (%)	   0.02 0.15 	   Missing	  (%)	   0.22 0.41 Italian	  (%)	   0.89 0.32 	   Unemployed	  or	  retired	  (%)	   0.04 0.19 First	  generation	  foreigner	  (%)	   0.05 0.22 	   Employee	  (%)	   0.39 0.49 Second	  generation	  foreigner	  (%)	   0.04 0.20 	   Entrepreneur	  (%)	   0.25 0.43 Pre-­‐primary	  school	     	   Middle	  manager	  (%)	   0.11 0.31 Missing	  (%)	   0.15 0.35 	   Mother	  education	     Yes	  (%)	   0.83 0.37 	   Missing	  (%)	   0.21 0.41 Age	     	   Primary	  (%)	   0.39 0.49 Missing	  (%)	   0.01 0.10 	   Secondary	  (%)	   0.29 0.45 Older	  than	  regular	  (%)	   0.03 0.16 	   Tertiary	  (%)	   0.11 0.32 Regular	  (%)	   0.87 0.33 	   Father	  education	     Younger	  than	  regular	  (%)	   0.09 0.29 	   Missing	  (%)	   0.22 0.42 Maths	  grade	     	   Primary	  (%)	   0.43 0.49 Missing	  (%)	   0.07 0.26 	   Secondary	  (%)	   0.25 0.43 1-­‐4	  (%)	   0.00 0.04 	   Tertiary	  (%)	   0.10 0.30 5	  (%)	   0.04 0.20 	   Mother	  nationality	     6-­‐7	  (%)	   0.38 0.48 	   Missing	  (%)	   0.09 0.28 8-­‐10	  (%)	   0.51 0.50 	   Italian	  (%)	   0.80 0.40 Italian	  grade	     	   Father	  nationality	     Missing	  (%)	   0.07 0.25 	   Missing(%)	   0.09 0.29 1-­‐4	  (%)	   0.00 0.04 	   Italian	  (%)	   0.82 0.39 5	  (%)	   0.04 0.19 	   Private	  school	   0.05 0.23 6-­‐7	  (%)	   0.41 0.49 	   Full	  time	  schedule	  class	   0.23 0.42 8-­‐10	  (%)	   0.48 0.50 	   Class	  size	   19.00 4.65 	  Panel	  b.	  
 Mean St Dev   Mean St Dev 
Has own bedroom    Number of siblings   
Missing (%) 0.03 0.17  Missing (%) 0.02 0.15 
Yes (%) 0.55 0.50  0 (%) 0.15 0.36 
Has internet access    1 (%) 0.55 0.50 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  2 (%) 0.20 0.40 
Yes (%) 0.76 0.43  3 (%) 0.05 0.21 
Has an encyclopedia    4 or more (%) 0.03 0.17 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Lives with   
Missing (%) 0.71 0.46  Missing (%) 0.02 0.15 
Has own desk    Both parents (%) 0.86 0.35 
Missing (%) 0.02 0.15  One parent only (%) 0.06 0.24 
Yes (%) 0.85 0.36  Both parents alternatively (%) 0.05 0.22 
Has a PC    Others (%) 0.01 0.08 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Language spoken at home   
Yes (%) 0.75 0.43  Missing (%) 0.04 0.21 
Has a place for homework    Italian (%) 0.73 0.44 
Missing (%) 0.03 0.16  Dialect (%) 0.15 0.36 
Yes (%) 0.84 0.37  Other (%) 0.07 0.25 
Number of books at home    Help with homework   
Missing (%) 0.04 0.20  Missing (%) 0.07 0.26 
0-10 (%) 0.12 0.33  No homework (%) 0.01 0.07 
11-25 (%) 0.25 0.43  No help needed (%) 0.20 0.40 
26-100 (%) 0.31 0.46  Parents (%) 0.45 0.50 
101-200 (%) 0.15 0.36  Siblings (%) 0.12 0.32 
>200 (%) 0.12 0.33  Private teacher (%) 0.03 0.17 
    Other (%) 0.04 0.20 
    No one (%) 0.09 0.28 Notes:	  The	  table	  reports	  the	  mean	  and	  standard	  deviation	  of	  each	  covariate	   included	  in	  the	  regressions.	  These	  statistics	  are	  based	  on	  individual,	  school	  and	  class	  level	  data.	  All	  covariates	  have	  been	  categorized	  and	  reported	  as	  dummy	  variables.	  While	  variables	   in	  Panel	  a	  are	  available	   for	   students	   in	  both	  grades,	   those	   in	  Panel	  b	  are	  available	  only	  for	  fifth	  graders.	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  Table	  3	  -­‐	  Balancing	  Tests	  -­‐	  Maths	  -­‐	  V	  grade	  	  Panel	  a.	  
 First Stage Second 
Stage 
  First Stage Second 
Stage 
    Mother occupation   
Private school (%) 0.003 .  Missing (%) -0.010 -0.023 
 (0.637) .   (0.353) (0.008) 
Full time schedule (%) 0.015 0.011  Unemployed or retired (%) 0.005 0.010 
 (0.315) (0.327)   (0.394) (0.065) 
Class size (%) 0.039 0.425  Employee (%) 0.002 0.004 
 (0.665) (0.000)   (0.682) (0.400) 
Gender    Entrepreneur (%) 0.001 0.005 
Missing (%) 0.005 0.021   (0.772) (0.020) 
 (0.002) (0.000)  Middle manager (%) 0.002 0.003 
Male (%) -0.003 -0.007   (0.291) (0.137) 
 (0.191) (0.068)  Father occupation   
Place of birth    Missing (%) -0.010 -0.023 
Missing (%) -0.014 -0.025   (0.330) (0.007) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  Unemployed or retired (%) -0.001 0.000 
Italy (%) 0.014 0.026   (0.558) (0.973) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  Employee (%) 0.000 0.014 
Citizenship     (0.970) (0.015) 
Missing (%) -0.008 -0.011  Entrepreneur (%) 0.010 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.000)   (0.035) (0.136) 
Italian (%) 0.008 0.010  Middle manager (%) 0.002 0.003 
 (0.032) (0.003)   (0.610) (0.407) 
First generation foreigner (%) -0.001 0.000  Mother education   
 (0.438) (0.863)  Missing (%) -0.011 -0.029 
Second generation foreigner (%) 0.002 0.002   (0.350) (0.001) 
 (0.215) (0.238)  Primary (%) 0.006 0.018 
Pre-primary school     (0.410) (0.005) 
Missing (%) -0.019 -0.008  Secondary (%) 0.002 0.010 
 (0.015) (0.236)   (0.634) (0.043) 
Yes (%) 0.018 0.008  Tertiary (%) 0.002 0.001 
 (0.027) (0.211)   (0.593) (0.822) 
Age    Father education   
Missing (%) 0.006 0.019  Missing (%) -0.011 -0.026 
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.306) (0.004) 
Older than regular (%) 0.000 0.001  Primary (%) 0.011 0.016 
 (0.733) (0.664)   (0.171) (0.020) 
Regular (%) -0.008 -0.016  Secondary (%) -0.001 0.008 
 (0.002) (0.000)   (0.860) (0.091) 
Younger than regular (%) 0.001 -0.003  Tertiary (%) 0.001 0.002 
 (0.510) (0.171)   (0.708) (0.507) 
Maths grade    Mother nationality   
Missing (%) -0.023 -0.008  Missing (%) -0.015 -0.012 
 (0.000) (0.126)   (0.015) (0.029) 
1-4 (%) 0.000 -0.001  Italian (%) 0.013 0.011 
 (0.480) (0.039)   (0.038) (0.052) 
5 (%) 0.001 0.000  Father nationality   
 (0.643) (0.888)  Missing (%) -0.015 -0.011 
6-7 (%) 0.010 0.007   (0.018) (0.031) 
 (0.025) (0.181)  Italian (%) 0.013 0.008 
8-10 (%) 0.012 0.002   (0.033) (0.150) 
 (0.032) (0.778)     
Italian grade       
Missing (%) -0.023 -0.006     
 (0.001) (0.209)     
1-4 (%) 0.000 0.000     
 (0.736) (0.277)     
5 (%) 0.000 0.001     
 (0.721) (0.727)     
6-7 (%) 0.007 0.004     
 (0.129) (0.501)     
8-10 (%) 0.015 0.002     
 (0.010) (0.683)     
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Panel	  b.	  	  	   First	  Stage	   Second	  Stage	   	   	   First	  Stage	   Second	  Stage	  Has	  own	  bedroom	   	   	   	   Number	  of	  siblings	   	   	  Missing	   (%)	   -­‐0.007	   -­‐0.008	   	   Missing (%)	   -­‐0.007	   -­‐0.007	  	   (0.007)	   (0.000)	   	   	   (0.002)	   (0.000)	  Yes (%)	   -­‐0.002	   0.004	   	   0 (%)	   0.000	   0.000	  	   (0.570)	   (0.343)	   	   	   (0.980)	   (0.934)	  Has	  internet	  access	   	   	   	   1 (%)	   0.004	   0.006	  Missing (%)	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.007	   	   	   (0.104)	   (0.091)	  	   (0.011)	   (0.001)	   	   2 (%)	   0.002	   0.001	  Yes (%)	   0.006	   0.007	   	   	   (0.365)	   (0.811)	  	   (0.066)	   (0.042)	   	   3 (%)	   0.001	   0.000	  Has	  an	  encyclopedia	   	   	   	   	   (0.345)	   (0.887)	  Missing (%)	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.006	   	   4	  or	  more (%)	   0.000	   0.000	  	   (0.014)	   (0.005)	   	   	   (0.655)	   (0.925)	  Yes (%)	   0.008	   0.015	   	   Lives	  with	   	   	  	   (0.010)	   (0.000)	   	   Missing (%)	   -­‐0.008	   -­‐0.008	  Has	  own	  desk	   	   	   	   	   (0.001)	   (0.000	  Missing (%)	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.006	   	   Both	  parents (%)	   0.008	   0.006)	  	   (0.013)	   (0.003)	   	   	   (0.003)	   (0.050	  Yes (%)	   0.004	   0.007	   	   One	  parent	  only (%)	   0.000	   0.001)	  	   (0.103)	   (0.020)	   	   	   (0.966)	   (0.693	  Has	  a	  PC	   	   	   	   Both	  parents	  alternatively 
(%)	   0.000	   0.002)	  Missing (%)	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.006	   	   	   (0.711)	   (0.318	  	   (0.020)	   (0.004)	   	   Others (%)	   0.000	   0.000)	  Yes (%)	   0.008	   0.010	   	   	   (0.372)	   (0.917	  	   (0.007)	   (0.006)	   	   Language	  spoken	  at	  home	   	   	  Has	  a	  place	  for	  homework	   	   	   	   Missing (%)	   -­‐0.008	   -­‐0.008	  Missing (%)	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.006	   	   	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	  	   (0.011)	   (0.003)	   	   Italian (%)	   0.003	   0.006	  Yes (%)	   0.007	   0.006	   	   	   (0.415)	   (0.195)	  	   (0.006)	   (0.051)	   	   Dialect (%)	   0.004	   0.002	  Number	  of	  books	  at	  home	   	   	   	   	   (0.237)	   (0.595)	  Missing (%)	   -­‐0.008	   -­‐0.007	   	   Other (%)	   0.001	   0.000	  	   (0.001)	   (0.001)	   	   	   (0.498)	   (0.951)	  0-­‐10 (%)	   -­‐0.001	   0.000	   	   Help	  with	  homework	   	   	  	   (0.788)	   (0.975)	   	   Missing (%)	   -­‐0.007	   -­‐0.005	  11-­‐25 (%)	   -­‐0.003	   0.000	   	   	   (0.004)	   (0.073)	  	   (0.194)	   (0.973)	   	   No	  homework (%)	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.001	  26-­‐100 (%)	   0.001	   0.005	   	   	   (0.019)	   (0.009)	  	   (0.542)	   (0.140)	   	   No	  help	  needed (%)	   -­‐0.002	   0.006	  101-­‐200 (%)	   0.005	   0.003	   	   	   (0.462)	   (0.097)	  	   (0.022)	   (0.346)	   	   Parents (%)	   0.005	   0.000	  >200 (%)	   0.006	   0.000	   	   	   (0.087)	   (0.989)	  	   (0.020)	   (0.875)	   	   Siblings (%)	   0.003	   -­‐0.001	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.046)	   (0.684)	  	   	   	   	   Private	  teacher (%)	   -­‐0.001	   0.001	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.349)	   (0.339)	  	   	   	   	   Other (%)	   0.002	   -­‐0.001	  	   	   	   	   	   (0.030)	   (0.276)	  	   	   	   	   No	  one (%)	   0.000	   0.002	  Notes:	  the	  table	  shows	  the	  point	  estimates	  and	  p-­‐values	  (in	  parentheses)	  of	  the	  balancing	  tests	  at	  the	  school	  level	  (first	  stage)	  and	  at	  class	  level	  within	  treated	  schools	  (second	  stage).	  For	  individual	  variables,	  we	  compute	  school	  or	  class	  averages	  and	  test	  for	  balancing	  using	  regressions	  (5)	  and	  (6)	  for	  the	  first	  and	  second	  stage,	  respectively.	  Full	  time	  schedule	  refers	  to	  schools	  offering	  this	  option	  in	  the	  first	  stage	  and	  to	  the	  schedule	  of	  the	  single	  class	  in	  the	   second	   stage.	   While	   variables	   in	   Panel	   a	   are	   available	   for	   students	   in	   both	   grades,	   those	   in	   Panel	   b	   are	  available	  for	  fifth	  grade	  students	  only.	  All	  regressions	  are	  weighted	  by	  the	  number	  of	  students	  in	  each	  school	  or	  class	  and	  use	  robust	  standard	  errors.	  *,	  p<.1;	  **,	  p<.05;	  ***p<.01.	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Table	  4.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐2.79***	   -­‐0.99***	   -­‐2.27***	   -­‐4.92***	  	   (0.	  27)	   (0.30)	   (0.52)	   (0.56)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.	  81***	   -­‐0.70***	   -­‐0.73**	   -­‐1.04***	  	   (0.19)	   (0.20)	   (0.34)	   (0.40)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐3.59***	   -­‐1.69***	   -­‐2.99***	   -­‐5.96***	  	   (0.250)	   (0.276)	   (0.484)	   (0.501)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,325	   11,541	   4,886	   10,898	  R-­‐squared	   0.97	   0.99	   0.98	   0.96	  	   	   	   	   	  Covariates	  in	  Table	  2	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   65.1	   63.9	   64.0	   66.8	  Notes:	   column	   (1)	   is	   for	   the	   full	   country	   and	   columns	   (2)	   to	   (4)	   are	   for	  Northern,	   Central	   and	   Southern	   Italy,	  respectively.	  All	  models	   include	  regional	  dummies	  and	  regional	  dummies	   interacted	  with	  school	  size,	  with	   the	  number	  of	  classes	  in	  fifth	  grade	  in	  the	  school	  and	  with	  number	  of	  students	  in	  the	  class.	  Estimates	  are	  weighted	  by	  class	  size.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Table	  5.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring	  on	  Student	  Motivation.	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Positive	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   0.25	   -­‐0.92***	   -­‐0.08	   0.635	  	   (0.43)	   (0.29)	   (0.408)	   (0.407)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   0.25	   0.01	   0.356	   -­‐0.007	  	   (0.28)	   (0.19)	   (0.261)	   (0.264)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   0.50	   -­‐0.90***	   0.275	   0.628*	  	   (0.39)	   (0.272)	   (0.375)	   (0.373)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,141	   27,142	   27,141	   27,140	  R-­‐squared	   0.94	   0.75	   0.92	   0.93	  	  	   	   	   	   	  Covariates	  in	  Table	  2	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   61.0	   19.2	   50.7	   53.1	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	  In	  each	  column,	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  students	  in	  the	  class	  who	  agree	  with	  the	  following	  sentences:	  1)	  I	  was	  already	  anxious	  before	  starting	  the	  test;	  2)	  I	  was	  so	  nervous	  I	  couldn’t	  find	  the	  answers;	  3)	  while	  answering,	  I	  felt	  like	  I	  was	  doing	  badly;	  4)	  while	  answering,	  I	  was	  calm.	  The	  estimates	  refer	  to	  the	  entire	  country.	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Table	  6.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring	  on	  the	  Coefficient	  of	  Variation,	  the	  Standard	  Deviation	  and	  the	  Quartiles	  of	  the	  Distribution	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  within	  the	  Class.	  Southern	  Italy	  -­‐	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	  	   Coefficient	  of	  Variation	   Standard	  Deviation	   p_25	   p_50	   p_75	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   3.82***	   1.34***	   -­‐6.72***	   -­‐5.57***	   -­‐4.18***	  	   (0.39)	   (0.17)	   (0.66)	   (0.62)	   (0.56)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   0.47*	   0.13	   -­‐0.90*	   -­‐0.91**	   -­‐0.93**	  	   (0.26)	   (0.12)	   (0.48)	   (0.44)	   (0.39)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   4.30***	   1.47***	   -­‐7.62***	   -­‐6.48***	   -­‐5.10***	  	   (0.368)	   (0.157)	   (0.591)	   (0.561)	   (0.508)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   10,898	   10,898	   10,898	   10,898	   10,898	  R-­‐squared	   0.83	   0.88	   0.92	   0.95	   0.97	  Covariates	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   22.8	   14.1	   55.6	   65.6	   75.2	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	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Table	  7.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring	  on	  the	  Heterogeneity	  of	  Answers	  within	  each	  Class.	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  Variable:	  Average	  Herfindhal	  Index	  within	  Each	  Class.	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	   	   	   	   	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   4.35***	   1.46***	   2.99***	   8.00***	  	   (0.37)	   (0.38)	   (0.68)	   (0.77)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   1.08***	   0.86***	   0.95**	   1.50***	  	   (0.26)	   (0.27)	   (0.48)	   (0.57)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   5.43***	   2.32***	   3.94***	   9.50***	  	   (0.339)	   (0.350)	   (0.630)	   (0.692)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,325	   11,541	   4,886	   10,898	  R-­‐squared	   0.94	   0.98	   0.96	   0.88	  Covariates	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   57.3	   61.8	   60.1	   51.4	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	  
	  




	  Table	  A.1.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Italian	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐2.61***	   -­‐1.03***	   -­‐2.17***	   -­‐4.39***	  	   (0.21)	   (0.23)	   (0.43)	   (0.42)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.67***	   -­‐0.38**	   -­‐0.81***	   -­‐0.99***	  	   (0.15)	   (0.17)	   (0.28)	   (0.31)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐3.28***	   -­‐1.41***	   -­‐2.98***	   -­‐5.37***	  	   (0.194)	   (0.205)	   (0.393)	   (0.381)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,369	   11,557	   4,894	   10,918	  R-­‐squared	   0.98	   0.99	   0.99	   0.97	  Covariates	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   70.0	   70.2	   70.1	   69.7	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	  	  	  Table	  A.2.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Maths	  –	  II	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐4.20***	   -­‐1.57***	   -­‐3.09***	   -­‐7.50***	  	   (0.30)	   (0.34)	   (0.55)	   (0.61)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐1.22***	   -­‐0.91***	   -­‐1.37***	   -­‐1.53***	  	   (0.22)	   (0.25)	   (0.42)	   (0.47)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐5.42***	   -­‐2.48***	   -­‐4.47***	   -­‐9.03***	  	   (0.274)	   (0.312)	   (0.501)	   (0.547)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,012	   11,724	   4,905	   10,383	  R-­‐squared	   0.96	   0.98	   0.97	   0.94	  Covariates	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   62.9	   59.9	   61.8	   66.7	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	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Table	  A.3.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Italian	  –	  II	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐3.40***	   -­‐1.36***	   -­‐2.17***	   -­‐6.21***	  	   (0.28)	   (0.34)	   (0.55)	   (0.54)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐1.04***	   -­‐0.71***	   -­‐1.25***	   -­‐1.33***	  	   (0.20)	   (0.24)	   (0.39)	   (0.41)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐4.44***	   -­‐2.07***	   -­‐3.42***	   -­‐7.54***	  	   (0.250)	   (0.301)	   (0.501)	   (0.481)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,025	   11,721	   4,911	   10,393	  R-­‐squared	   0.971	   0.98	   0.98	   0.96	  Covariates	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   65.9	   65.0	   66.2	   66.7	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	  	  	  	  Table	  A.4.	  GLM	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐2.74***	   -­‐0.95***	   -­‐2.27***	   -­‐4.74***	  	   (0.27)	   (0.30)	   (0.51)	   (0.53)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.79***	   -­‐0.76***	   -­‐0.73**	   -­‐0.96**	  	   (0.19)	   (0.20)	   (0.34)	   (0.39)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐3.53***	   -­‐1.71***	   -­‐3.00***	   -­‐5.70***	  	   (0.242)	   (0.271)	   (0.472)	   (0.469)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,325	   11,541	   4,886	   10,898	  Covariates	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   65.1	   63.9	   64.0	   66.8	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	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Table	  A.5.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  Finite	  Population	  Correction.	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐2.89***	   -­‐1.08***	   -­‐2.35***	   -­‐5.05***	  	   (0.09)	   (0.10)	   (0.17)	   (0.17)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.83***	   -­‐0.71***	   -­‐0.70***	   -­‐1.06***	  	   (0.06)	   (0.07)	   (0.11)	   (0.12)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐3.72***	   -­‐1.79***	   -­‐3.05***	   -­‐6.11***	  	   (0.0789)	   (0.0880)	   (0.155)	   (0.155)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27325	   11541	   4886	   10898	  R-­‐squared	   0.97	   0.99	   0.98	   0.96	  Covariates	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   65.1	   63.9	   64.0	   66.8	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	  	  	  Table	  A.6.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  of	  Correct	  Answers	  in	  the	  Class.	  Without	  Covariates.	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐2.82***	   -­‐0.85**	   -­‐2.04***	   -­‐5.29***	  	   (0.29)	   (0.33)	   (0.55)	   (0.58)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.70***	   -­‐0.82***	   -­‐0.46	   -­‐0.70*	  	   (0.20)	   (0.23)	   (0.37)	   (0.42)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐3.52***	   -­‐1.68***	   -­‐2.50***	   -­‐5.99***	  	   (0.264)	   (0.302)	   (0.499)	   (0.527)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,325	   11,541	   4,886	   10,898	  R-­‐squared	   0.97	   0.98	   0.98	   0.95	  Covariates	   No	   No	   No	   No	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   65.1	   63.9	   64.0	   66.8	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   26	  
Table	  A.7.	  Weighted	  OLS	  estimates	  of	  the	  Effects	  of	  External	  Monitoring.	  Maths	  –	  V	  grade.	  Dependent	  variable:	  Percentage	  Absent	  from	  the	  Test	  	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	  	   Italy	   North	   Centre	   South	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Direct	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.53**	   -­‐0.50	   -­‐0.47	   -­‐0.55	  	   (0.25)	   (0.41)	   (0.47)	   (0.41)	  Indirect	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.10	   0.44	   -­‐0.44	   -­‐0.51	  	   (0.18)	   (0.28)	   (0.35)	   (0.32)	  Total	  Effect	  x	  100	   -­‐0.626***	   -­‐0.0586	   -­‐0.913**	   -­‐1.06***	  	   (0.219)	   (0.356)	   (0.424)	   (0.359)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   27,325	   11,541	   4,886	   10,898	  R-­‐squared	   0.5634	   0.5756	   0.6127	   0.5331	  Covariates	   No	   No	   No	   No	  	   	   	   	   	  Mean	  -­‐	  Untreated	  Schools	   11.0	   10.4	   11.7	   11.4	  Notes:	  see	  Table	  4	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